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Abstract
Recently, Cabello et al. (2016) claim to have proven the existence of an empirically
verifiable difference between two broad classes of quantum interpretations. On the basis
of three seemingly uncontentious assumptions, (i) the possibility of randomly selected
measurements, (ii) the finiteness of a quantum system’s memory, and (iii) the validity
of Landauer’s principle, and further, by applying computational mechanics to quantum
processes, the authors arrive at the conclusion that some quantum interpretations
(including central realist interpretations) are associated with an excess heat cost and
are thereby untenable—or at least—that they can be distinguished empirically from
their competitors by measuring the heat produced. Here, we provide an explicit
counterexample to this claim and demonstrate that their surprising result can be traced
back to a lack of distinction between system and external agent. By drawing the
distinction carefully, we show that the resulting heat cost is fully accounted for in
the external agent, thereby restoring the tenability of the quantum interpretations in
question.
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1 Introduction
For nearly a century, physicists and philosophers alike have puzzled over how to interpret
quantum theory, unable to decide unambiguously between a variety of more or less promising
candidates. In a recent publication, Cabello et al. (2016) put forward an argument which
seeks to demonstrate the existence of a real, physical—as opposed merely to a metaphysical—
difference between various interpretations of quantum mechanics. Moreover, the authors
assert that it is in principle possible to measure this difference experimentally. Their
argument is based on methods derived from computational mechanics—a growing field
that is concerned with the simulation and prediction of stochastic processes. Interestingly,
when applied to certain physical processes, computational mechanics is able to provide us
with thermodynamical limitations on these processes (Wiesner et al., 2012; Garner et al.,
2015). Cabello et al.’s argument is a concrete, foundationally motivated, application of
computational mechanics which suggests that there is a thermodynamical cost to bear for
a subset of quantum interpretations: perhaps a pathological one.
The link between thermodynamics and computational mechanics can be understood as
follows: depending on the complexity, i.e., randomness, of a pattern that is to be simulated,
greater or fewer resources are needed in order either to create the pattern (as in writing it
on a shuffled medium) or to predict its future, given observations of past data sequences.
We can take the computational system we are interested in simulating to be a black box,
with the only accessible empirical data being its input and output variables. It can then
be proven that there exists a machine, called an -machine, which is predictively optimal
and uses the minimum resources, while simulating the input-output behaviour of the target
system (Crutchfield and Young, 1989). For some thermodynamic systems this method shows
up the limitations for work extraction via physical processes. Given a resource-theoretic
understanding of thermodynamics (i.e., an understanding which conceives thermodynamics
primarily to be a theory about what tasks one can perform when furnished with certain
resources1), one might say that computational mechanics can be considered a useful tool
for the task of understanding and enhancing the foundations of thermal physics.
Cabello et al. begin by dividing the set of quantum interpretations into two subsets, what
they term Type I and Type II interpretations. They then argue that Type I interpretations
are associated with a thermodynamical cost, rendering such interpretations highly prob-
lematic: either one of the (very plausible) three assumptions must be given up, or there
exists a surprising heat generation which could be ruled in or out experimentally (and one
would be surprised indeed if such heat generation were in fact to be found). If correct, this
1Modern accounts include (Horodecki and Oppenheim, 2013; Wallace, 2014; Brandao et al., 2015; Gour
et al., 2015), however, the underlying idea that thermodynamics is to be understood relative to an agent
and her means goes back to Maxwell (1871) (c.f. Myrvold (2011)) and was later famously promoted by
Jaynes (1965).
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result would seem an outstanding breakthrough whose far reaching consequences might not
only force us to abandon some of the most popular interpretations of quantum mechanics
(Type I interpretations include such favourites as de Broglie–Bohm theory, Everett, and
dynamical collapse theories such as GRW, for example) but would shake the foundations of
our understanding of the relationship between scientific theories and the underlying ontic
structure of the world.
Our prime concern in this paper is to assess Cabello et al.’s argument and the tenability of
their conclusions. But we also have their example in mind as a test-case for the application
of computational mechanics in pursuit of dividends in foundations of physics.
We will begin with a brief outline of stochastic input-output processes before presenting the
argument of Cabello et al. (2016), which applies this mathematical machinery to quantum
systems. We will then analyse why Cabello et al.’s argument about the thermodynamical
costs of some quantum interpretations fails, including offering a straightforward counterex-
ample. We will show that the adumbrated heat cost is in fact not associated with the
quantum system itself at all—it is not of quantum origin—and thus controversies over
quantum interpretations are not germane to it, nor it to them. Rather, the heat cost arises
with the external experimental setup stipulated by Cabello et al.
2 Computational Mechanics and the Foundations of Quan-
tum Mechanics
We begin by introducing the most important aspects of stochastic input-output processes,
as they form the backbone of the argument. More detailed discussions may be found in
(Barnett and Crutchfield, 2015; Crutchfield and Young, 1989).
2.1 Computational Mechanics: Input-Output Processes
The goal behind modelling systems’ behaviour by input-output processes is to find the
minimal structural requirements that produce a particular statistical pattern. To do so, one
works backwards from the statistics of experimental outputs to then find the minimal amount
of resources needed in order to simulate output strings that are statistically indistinguishable
from the actual experimental result.
More formally: A stochastic process ←→Y is described as a bi-infinite one-dimensional chain
..., Y−1, Y0, Y1, ... of discrete random variables {Yt} with values {yt}, where t is a discrete
time parameter and the direction of the arrow above the random variable indicates whether
the chain extends to the past (left arrow), the future (right arrow) or to past and future
(left-right arrow) infinity. The {yt} are the particular values the random variable takes
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at time t and in our case we can think of them as the output values of an experiment
performed on the system. For example, for a spin-measurement on a qubit—the kind of
case with which Cabello et al. will be concerned—the outcome-types could be “up” and
“down” for example, taken from the output alphabet Y = {“up”,“down”}. If not only the
output but also the input is stochastic (in our case, this will correspond to a choice of
spin-measurement basis, which will be taken to be random) the effect of the input random
variable on the future statistics needs to be taken into account as well. Such a process
must then be modelled by a so-called stochastic input-output process, ←→Y |←→X , with input
values {xt} from an alphabet X . The whole input-output process may then be described
as a collection of stochastic processes ←→Y |←→X ≡ {←→Y |←→x }←→x ∈←→X , where we take each process←→
Y |←→x to correspond to all possible output sequences←→Y that could arise from one particular
input sequence ←→x , drawn from the set of all possible input sequences ←→X .
The probability distribution2 over the set of all possible output sequences, given a particular
input sequence, is then given by what is called the channel’s distribution:
P(←→Y |←→x ) = {P(←→Y ∈ σ|←→X =←→x )}
σ⊆←→Y ,←→x ∈←→X (1)
The idea is now to divide the input-output sequences into pasts and future and furthermore
to divide the various input-output pasts into sets that yield the same distribution over
input-output futures. Two input-output pasts ←−z = (←−x ,←−y ) and ←−z ′ that yield the same
future input-output conditional probabilities P (−→Y |−→X,←−Z = ←−z ) = P (−→Y |−→X,←−Z = ←−z ′) are
then said to belong to the same causal state s. Denote the set of causal states S. The
-map is then introduced as the mapping  : ←−Z → S from any input-output past onto
its corresponding causal state (Barnett and Crutchfield, 2015). This map also induces a
probability distribution over the causal states, which since the process is stationary and 
is time-independent, is called the process’ stationary distribution. The causal states contain
all the relevant information for optimally predicting the future output statistics of the
system and contain as much information as any of its input-output pasts. Here we take the
input sequences to be uniformly distributed. The minimal amount of information needed
to be stored in order to predict future outputs optimally is then given by the Shannon
information H(S) and is called the statistical complexity. This also quantifies the amount
of resources needed in order to model the system’s future behaviour.
2.2 Foundations: Division of Interpretations into two Groups
Cabello et al. (2016) seek to use the above machinery in combination with a few plausible
assumptions to raise difficulties for a group of well-known quantum interpretations. Their
2We consider only stationary probabilities, which means that the probabilities are time translation
invariant.
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approach is to divide the set of quantum interpretations into two broad classes, based on
their respective takes on quantum probabilities: Type I interpretations are interpretations
that regard probabilities as determined by “intrinsic properties of the system” (Cabello
et al., 2016, p.1). These properties typically change post-measurement, depending on the
choice of measurement performed on the quantum system. Examples which they mention
of Type I interpretations include de Broglie-Bohm theory (Bohm, 1952; Goldstein, 2001),
many worlds interpretations, e.g. (Everett, 1957; Wallace, 2012), Ballentine’s statistical
interpretation (Ballentine, 1970), modal interpretations (Lombardi and Dieks, 2016) and
consistent histories, as well as GRW dynamical collapse theories (Ghirardi et al., 1986) and
Spekkens’ toy model (Spekkens, 2007).
Type II interpretations, on the other hand, comprise those interpretations which treat
probabilities as “relational properties between an observer and the system” (Cabello
et al., 2016, p.1). According to such interpretations, the quantum state corresponds to
the “experiences an observer has of the observed system”(Cabello et al., 2016, p.1). To
the class of Type II interpretations, the authors assign, amongst others, the Copenhagen
interpretation, Wheeler’s view (Wheeler and Zurek, 2014), relational interpretations (Rovelli,
1996) and QBist interpretations (Fuchs and Peres, 2007).
We note to begin that there are some significant problems associated with such a division
of interpretations. First, some of the interpretations listed as Type I do not seem unam-
biguously to belong in either camp: the Everett interpretation, for instance, may well be
taken to imply that probabilities ought to be regarded relationally as opposed to being
intrinsic properties of a quantum system. After all, the Everettian could argue, the ‘bare
quantum formalism’ is fully deterministic at the fundamental level. The probabilities, by
contrast, occur at an emergent level and justifications of the Born rule are typically given
via decision-theoretic arguments (Wallace, 2012), very strongly suggesting that probabilities
in Everett, if they need an interpretation at all, are best interpreted as concerning relational
experiences of an agent within a given branch.
The Type I/ Type II distinction also seems problematic with regard to Ψ-epistemic
interpretations, in which the quantum state is taken to represent information about how
a system is3. For instance, the probabilities occurring in Spekkens’ toy model—which
allegedly belongs to the Type I camp—are purely epistemic and result from an incomplete
knowledge about the underlying ontic state4 (Spekkens, 2007), as opposed to being intrinsic
properties of the system: they merely occur on the level of the observer whereas the
underlying ontic evolution could be, for all we know, a deterministic one. It thereby seems
somewhat misplaced to regard these probabilities as “observer-independent” (Cabello et al.,
3For details on the Ψ-ontic/Ψ-epistemic distinction, see Harrigan and Spekkens (2010).
4In analogy with Jaynes’ view of probabilities in classical statistical mechanics, where the probability
distribution over the underlying ontic state equally represents ignorance (Jaynes, 1965)
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2016, p.1), in the sense of being part of the furniture of the world, a notion more commonly
found in the context of propensity interpretations of probabilities (Popper, 2002), but
certainly not in an epistemic context.
We may try to make clearer sense of the Type I/ Type II distinction by phrasing it differently
in order to capture what Cabello et al. seem to have in mind: namely a distinction between
interpretations that either endorse or reject the notion of an underlying ontic physical
state. What the interpretations listed under Type II then have in common is that they
all roughly follow along Niels Bohr’s line: There is no quantum world. At least, there is
not a free-standing mind- and agent- independent one. Type II interpretations thereby
operate on a completely different level from Type I interpretations, the latter of which
consider quantum mechanics as ultimately describing a free-standing mind-independent
objective reality. Drawing a distinction between these fundamentally different conceptions
of scientific theory on the basis of their conception of probabilities, however, is misleading
and unsatisfying. The probabilities are mere epiphytes on a deeper, more pressing issue
about the nature of science.
Consequently, if Cabello et al. are indeed correct and Type I interpretations could be
ruled-out experimentally, then their result would have profound consequences: it undermines
one of our core traditional conceptions of scientific practice, namely that scientific theories
tell us what the world independent of us is like.
2.3 Three Assumptions
As Cabello et al. explain, their argument concerning Type I interpretations rests on three
assumptions, which we can state as follows:
(i) Which measurement is performed on a system is decided randomly, and in particular
independently of the state of the system.
(ii) A (finite dimensional) quantum system has a limited memory.
(iii) Landauer’s principle is valid.
They go on to suggest that for Type I interpretations, it follows from (i) that a system’s
intrinsic properties typically ought to change, depending on which measurement is performed
on the system. When the authors speak of ‘limited memory’, (ii), they seem to have in
mind something like the following: when a system is being measured in some basis, it
typically generates a new value of its intrinsic property or set of intrinsic properties, which
will determine the quantum probabilities of the future measurements. Measurement in
a different basis will force the system to change these values in order to comply with
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the correct quantum probabilities, thereby deleting—or perhaps rather overwriting—the
previous values. Due to its limited memory capacity, the system cannot possess all the
intrinsic values that will determine the probabilities of all possible measurement series.
We may assume that by ‘intrinsic properties’ Cabello et al. have in mind properties that
determine the probabilities of future measurement outcomes as opposed to properties
specifying pre-determined definite outcomes, the reason being that this latter interpretation
of “intrinsic properties” would force us to adapt some sort of hidden variable interpretation,
which, by definition is only a subgroup of the Type I class. We therefore take it that the
former meaning of ‘intrinsic properties’ is intended.
Preliminary assumption (iii) is the validity of Landauer’s principle. As it is often stated,
Landauer’s principle asserts that the erasure of information in a system’s information
bearing degrees of freedom is accompanied by an increase of entropy in the non-information
bearing degrees of freedom (Landauer, 1961). This increase of entropy will lead to the
dissipation of kT ln 2 of heat per deleted bit, where T is taken by Cabello et. al. to be the
temperature of the system (though more usually it is taken to be the temperature of the
environment) and k is, of course, the Boltzmann constant.
2.4 Heat Dissipation between Successive Measurements
We are now invited to consider a single qubit, on which an observer performs successive
projective measurements in one of the two Pauli-bases, σx or σz, chosen at random with
equal probability (assumption (i)). Since the state of the qubit changes after non-orthogonal
measurements, within a Type I framework the internal properties of the system must change
too. Given that the system has limited memory (assumption (ii)), it needs to generate new
values that determine its future behaviour and store them in its memory. To do so, the
system will need—as they put it—to ‘erase information’. Applying Landauer’s principle
(assumption (iii)), Cabello et al. (2016) finally conclude that during this erasure process,
heat is dissipated into the environment.
To quantify the amount of information that needs to be erased, they model the system
as a computational machine, a black box that generates output strings on the basis of
some input and its internal memory. The optimal and minimal machine that is able to
produce output strings that are statistically indistinguishable from the actual experimental
outcomes, will be, as we mentioned earlier, an -machine (Crutchfield and Young, 1989).
It maximises the mutual information between input-output past and output future, thus
simulating the statistical process, and with minimal resources.
Applying the computational mechanical machinery to the qubit in question, we identify the
input random variable Xt with the choice of measurement basis, randomly selected from
the alphabet X = {σx, σz}. The output variable Yt represents the measurement results
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and can take values ±1. The causal state after the measurement is simply taken to be the
respective quantum state, so = |0〉, s1 = |1〉, s+ = |+〉 or s− = |−〉 (with, note, no specific
view here taken on the ontology or otherwise, of the quantum state).
The machine has a probability 1/2 of changing its causal state after a measurement. Hence,
half of the time, it must update its internal properties, and Cabello et al maintain that
this requires the erasure of information. They say “The average information that must be
erased per measurement is the information contained in the causal state previous to the
measurement, St−1, that is not contained in the causal state after the measurement, St.”
(Cabello et al., 2016, p.2). It should be noted that this formulation is perhaps somewhat
misleading, as it suggests that a particular causal state itself carries a certain amount of
information. In fact, it is not the causal state to which we assign an entropy, but it is
instead the probability distribution over causal states which is associated with an entropy
and thereby with a Shannon information. Such an average over causal states however is
not a causal state itself.
In any case, the amount of information that needs to be erased is equal to the conditional
entropy of
Ierased = H(St−1|Xt, Yt, St). (2)
(See Appendix.)
In the given experiment, the probability distribution over the causal states is uniform,
which allows us to only consider a particular causal state s0, brought about by a particular
measurement σz in order to determine Ierased. Together with the fact that H(Yt|St) = 0, the
average erased information for the case of a successively measured qubit is then calculated
to be
Ierased = H(St−1|σz, s0) = −
∑
sj∈S
P (St−1 = sj |σz, s0) logP (St−1 = sj |σz, s0). (3)
The three possible causal states at time t− 1 are s0, s+ and s−, with transition probabilities
1/2, 1/4 and 1/4.5 The conditional entropy then turns out to be Ierased = −12 log 12 − 2 ·
1
4 log
1
4 =
3
2 bits.
Cabello et al. (2016) thereby conclude that once we accept assumptions (i)–(iii), it follows
that the system on average must dissipate 32kT ln 2 units of heat per measurement, if
understood as belonging to Type I.6 In principle, the above experiment could be implemented
5The authors write at time t, but must have intended t− 1.
6The authors furthermore generalise their result to N-outcome measurements with an associated heat
generation which scales linearly with N. Thus sufficient measurements on a single system would produce as
much heat as you like. This does not sound promising for Type I interpretations.
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in a lab. From our previous observations of measurements on quantum systems, it is however
safe to say that we would be very surprised indeed to observe any such heat dissipation.
Cabello et al. thereby suggest that Type I interpretations are unlikely to be representative
of the world, at least if their plausible assumptions (i)–(iii) hold. The above argument
supposedly does not apply to Type II interpretations, however, as for these interpretations
“measurement outcomes are created randomly when the observables are measured, without
any need to overwrite information in the system and therefore without the system dissipating
heat due to Landauer’s principle” (Cabello et al., 2016, p.3).
In the conclusion of their paper Cabello et al. do canvass the possibility that one or more
of assumptions (i)–(iii) might be thought to fail instead of Type I interpretations being
lumbered with an excess heat cost, and in particular they judge that the de Broglie–Bohm
theory and the Everett interpretation should not havehe excess heat quantity attached to
them, as both interpretations violate (ii)—the finite memory assumption. As they see it,
in the de Broglie–Bohm case this is because the ontology includes a continuous field (the
unitarily evolving wave function), and in the Everett case, because one has a splitting into
a plurality of worlds. But it is at best obscure that either de Broglie–Bohm or Everett
should be thought to violate the finite memory assumption. In the de Broglie–Bohm case,
from the fact that the quantum state is taken to be real7 it does not follow that a system
has infinite memory capacity: nearly all the state is irrelevant to the time evolution of the
definite physical quantities most of the time anyway due to decoherence, whilst a particle’s
motion is only guided by the value of the wavefunction assigned to the region immediately
surrounding it in any case. And one might note that realist collapse theories such as GRW
also have a continuous field in them: what difference could it make to judgements of memory
capacity whether the continuous field (sometimes) jumps around stochastically (GRW) or
whether it instead evolves determinisically but most of it being irrelevant to the evolution
of a particle (de Broglie–Bohm)? With regard to Everett: even if there is branching, each
world would be one in which the finite memory condition held, so each world would be one
in which the excess heat cost obtained. If anything, this would look worse, rather than
better, for Everett.
In fact, Cabello et al. are quite right that there is no excess heat cost which arises for de
Broglie–Bohm or for Everett, but this is not for the reason they allege (the possibility of
infinite memory capacity). Rather it is, as we shall see, an instance of a general proposition:
there is no excess heat cost for any Type I interpretation over a Type II interpretation.
7Putting aside those views which would see it as law-like—nomological rather than ontological.(Duerr
et al., 1995, 2012)
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3 Limitations of Computational Mechanics
Let us now analyse how Cabello et al. arrive at their surprising results. We will begin with
a brief recapitulation of Landauer’s principle before delivering an explicit counterexample
to Cabello et al.’s claim and then identifying the shortcomings of their argument.
3.1 Interlude: Landauer’s Principle and Irreversibility
A great deal in this argument hinges on the application of Landauer’s principle, often taken
to be the claim that the implementation of a logically irreversible operation is accompanied
by a dissipation8 of kT ln 2 units of heat per bit into the environment. An operation is
considered to be logically irreversible, if the output of the operation does not uniquely
determine the input (Landauer, 1961). Often, the concept of information is invoked in order
to describe this logical irreversibility. Wiesner et al. (2012) write that “logically irreversible
operations forget information about the computational device’s preceding logical state.”
[p.4060].
To appreciate why such characterisations of Landauer’s principle in terms of ‘forgetting’
can be misleading, however, we consider a logically irreversibly operation which can be
implemented without any heat cost, the so-called RAND operation (Maroney, 2005). RAND
randomises the logical state of a bit, regardless of its input state. Physically, we may think
of an implementation of RAND in the standard way of considering a molecule in a box, in
which a partition is included. The molecule is originally on the left side (or right side) of the
box and the whole system is in contact with a heat bath at temperature THB. Implementing
RAND then simply requires one to remove the partition, wait for a sufficiently long time and
then re-insert the partition. The operation is logically irreversible because the output (the
randomly distributed molecule) does not uniquely determine the input (the molecule being
in one of the two mutually exclusive states)—but obviously there was no heat exchange
with the environment during this process. In a very naive sense, the RAND operation
has ‘erased information’, but this erasure of information has taken place at no heat cost.
Landauer’s principle therefore cannot simply be the statement that the implementation of
a logically irreversible operation leads to the dissipation of heat into the environment.
The most prominent application of Landauer’s principle is the so-called Landauer erasure
process, a resetting operation that maps the state of a randomised bit back to some pre-
defined initial state. For the above described molecule-in-a-box scenario, such an erasure
can be implemented by removing the partition and then pushing it isothermally in from
one side of the box, until the particle is found once again certainly in the left (or right) side
of the box. For this last step, work is performed on the system and heat is transferred into
8Heat dissipation is generally taken to be thermodynamically irreversible.
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the surrounding heat bath9. This is done in a thermodynamically reversible fashion and
therefore corresponds to a heat transfer and not to a heat dissipation. Because the system
ends up in a pre-defined state, the Landauer erasure is distinct from the RAND operation
described above, although both of them are logically irreversible. In general, whether or not
a given logical operation can be performed in a thermodynamically reversible or irreversible
depends on the choice of implementation. In principle therefore, any logical operation can
be implemented in a thermodynamically reversible fashion. More details on this can be
found in (Maroney, 2009), who’s approach we follow closely in this section.
What Landauer’s principle does is provide us with a link between logical operations and
the fundamental microdynamics. Properly put, it states that a logical transformation,
reversible or irreversible, must be accompanied by a minimal average heat dissipation into
the environment according to
〈∆Q〉 ≥ −THB∆S, (4)
where ∆S refers to the difference in von Neumann entropy between the two physical
ensembles that correspond to the two logical states α and β, and ∆Q is the heat generated
in the environment (Maroney, 2009). Phrased like this, Landauer’s principle not only
becomes utterly unmysterious, it also becomes clear that whether or not heat is transferred
into the environment solely depends on the von Neumann entropy of the system before and
after the operation. This means in particular that one does not need to make any reference
to information erasure or the like.
If we re-write Landauer’s principle in a way that makes use of the concept of information
by having it explicitly include the entropy of the information bearing degrees of freedom,
the change in (Gibbs-) von Neumann entropy is related to the change in Shannon entropy
by ∆S = ∑β P (β)Sβ +∑α P (α)Sα + k∆H ln 2, with ∆H being the change in Shannon
entropy. Making use of Equation (4), Landauer’s principle then becomes
∆SNI ≥ −k∆H ln 2, (5)
where the entropy change of the non-information bearing degrees of freedom is given by
the entropy change in the environment and the weighted entropy changes of the sub-
ensembles: ∆SNI = ∆SE +
∑
β P (β)Sβ −
∑
α P (α)Sα. This quantity is increasing for
logically irreversible, deterministic operations. For non-deterministic operations however, it
is decreasing, making Equation (4) more useful in the general context.
9Similarly in the quantum case for a qubit, one needs to step-wise raise one of the two energy levels to
infinity (Barnett and Crutchfield, 2015).
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Now: Let us consider applying Landauer’s principle in the form of Equation (4) to the
repeatedly measured quantum system. It is clear that once the measurement process is up
and running, the quantum system will be in a maximally mixed state at each time step,
independent of the chosen measurement basis. This means that the difference in the von
Neumann entropy of the quantum system before and after each measurement is zero. Given,
furthermore, that the density matrix is the appropriate entity for calculating the entropy of
a quantum system—even if one’s interpretation involves further variables as is the case in
the de Broglie–Bohm theory for example—it follows that Landauer’s principle does not
predict a heat cost for Type I interpretations: the lower bound on heat dissipation into
the environment is zero.10 Notice that we have had to say nothing here of the storing or
deleting or erasure of information.
But now, interestingly, we seem to have arrived at a contradiction: On the one hand,
applying Landauer’s principle to the successive measurements on a quantum system seems
to entail a non-zero lower bound to the average heat cost per measurement. Whilst on the
other it entails a zero lower bound. What needs to give?
In fact, nothing. This appearance of contradiction is misleading. The two results are not in
fact in conflict. Both involve licit applications of Landauer’s principle, but it is only the
second (the zero heat minimum heat cost claim) which pertains to features of the quantum
system.
To explain this point and to help clarify where Cabello et al.’s argument has gone wrong, we
will now construct an explicit counterexample to their argument. It will become apparent
that the heat cost they calculate does not stem from the quantum system itself but from
the particular setup that is chosen. The heat cost will be shown to be due to external
matters.
3.2 A Counterexample: Type I without Heat Dissipation
Spekkens’ toy model (Spekkens, 2007) is explicitly taken to be a Type I interpretation. We
will make use of this simple and transparent framework in order to illustrate how successive
measurements in non-orthogonal bases do not lead to a predicted heat cost.
In Spekkens’ toy model, measurements of the system only yield incomplete knowledge about
the underlying state in such a way that the maximal amount of knowledge about the ontic
state equals the lack of knowledge about it. A Spekkens qubit can be in one of four possible
10N.B. In the standard case in de Broglie–Bohm in which the distribution of particle positions is given by
the Born rule then one will calculate the entropy of the system via its density matrix. If the distribution is
not given by the Born-rule—the system is not in quantum equilibrium, in the phrase—there will be rather
more pressing departures from standard quantum predictions than simply thermal ones. (Valentini, 1991a,b,
2002)
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ontic states, ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’ or ‘4’. Measurements are identified with questions of the form: is
the system in state 1 ∨ 2 or 3 ∨ 4 (measurement in the |0〉 / |1〉 basis), or, alternatively, 1 ∨
3 or 2 ∨ 4 (measurement in the |+〉 / |−〉 basis)? A measurement result of |0〉 will therefore
yield a state of knowledge of 1 ∨ 2. Impressively, quantum behaviour of a single qubit for
measurements restricted to the x, y, and z bases is fully recovered in this model.
If a system is prepared to be in 1 ∨ 3 but then measured to be in 1 ∨ 2, thereby performing
the Spekkens equivalent of a non-orthogonal measurement, we know for a fact that the
system must have been in ontic state 1 before the measurement (Spekkens, 2007). This
means that it is possible to know the precise ontic state of the system at an earlier time,
but impossible to know it at the current time. A measurement in a non-orthogonal basis
therefore disturbs the system in such a way that its values become non-definite in its
previous basis.
Since we only consider measurements in the x and z directions, we can illustrate Spekkens’
toy model conveniently by considering a classical particle entrapped in a two dimensional
box in contact with a heat bath, as illustrated in Figure (1a). Each section of the box
corresponds to one of the four ontic states the particle can be in. To perform measurements,
either a horizontal or a vertical partition can be inserted. A measurement in the |0〉 / |1〉
basis for example corresponds to inserting a partition vertically (Figure 1b) ) and measuring
on which side of the partition the particle is found. Performing a measurement in the
|+〉 / |−〉 basis in contrast corresponds to the insertion of the partition horizontally before
measuring the the particle’s position (Figure 1c) ). There can only be one partition in
the box at a given time, and so in order to perform a measurement in the |+〉 / |−〉 basis
by inserting the partition horizontally, we need to remove the partition from the previous
measurement in the |0〉 / |1〉 basis. This must happen sufficiently quickly compared to the
free motion of the particle so as to ensure that two consecutive measurements in the same
basis yield the same result.
With the above setup at hand, we now implement Cabello et al.’s experiment and include
successive random measurements in non-orthogonal bases.
We begin by noting the need to distinguish between two notions of measurement which one
might have in mind. On the one hand, one can consider some physical process taking place
which leaves the system in some definite value of some observable. (A definite possessed
value of the observable, whether or not anyone knows it.) On the other hand, one might
consider an external observer or agent who comes to know what the definite value (or values)
a system possesses at a given time are. (This difference is akin to the selective/non-selective
measurement distinction familiar in quantum foundations.) Such an external observer need
not be a person, but could be anything that reliably correlates with the measurement
outcome, such as a memory cell.
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4
Figure 1: Illustration of standard measurements in Spekkens’ toy model. We consider a classical
particle in a two dimensional box. a) illustrates how at each instant, the particle is in one of 4
mutually exclusive ontic states. Measurements in the standard bases are modeled as the b) vertical
or c) horizontal insertions of a partition into the box, followed by a location measurement that allows
one to identify the particle’s position as either being left/right or top/bottom. Two consecutive
left/right and top/bottom measurements are non-commutative.
We first consider the case in which there is no external agent. Measurements on the Spekkens
particle are performed by either the horizontal or vertical insertion of the partition. In
order to implement Cabello et al.’s experimental setup, we require that the orientation of
the partition change randomly, in such a way that it has a probability of 50% of remaining
in its previous position and a probability of 50% of changing its orientation from horizontal
to vertical or vice versa. This is an implementation of Cabello et al.’s random variable
Xt. At each time step, the system will be in a well defined state with definite values.
It is evident prima facie that there is no heat exchange with the environment at any
point11. Moreover, this Spekkens setup is merely a more elaborate version of the previously
introduced RAND operation. Evidently the system is in a definite state with definite values
after each measurement, however, this “generation” of new values is not accompanied by a
heat exchange with the environment.
One may object to the above reasoning by demanding that the partition itself must have a
reset state, that it therefore must delete information and reset itself after each measurement.
However, the described Spekkens’ setup does not require a costly Landauer erasure: the
system overwrites its previous state after each time step12. As there is no external agent
who records the measurement outcomes by correlating a measurement apparatus with the
system’s state, there are no resources needed for this implementation of measurements.
11Whether or not the act of removing and re-inserting the partition is thermodynamically reversible or
irreversible is debatable given to the single particle nature of the experiment. One may argue that the
removal of the partition resembles a free expansion, which is thermodynamically irreversible. However, if
we take thermodynamic reversibility to be equal with the claim that the (Gibbs–) von Neumann entropy
of the system remains constant, then the removal and re-insertion of the partition is indeed reversible, in
accordance with Maroney (2009). Either way, there is clearly no heat exchanged with the environment.
12The behaviour of the partition for example could be implemented by a beam splitter, followed by a
NOT operation on the one hand and the identity operation on the other hand. In particular, no reference
to the partition’s previous state must be made for either of those operations.
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Figure 2: Illustration of the various steps in an exemplary measurement cycle.
The situation changes if we require the measurement performed and the result obtained to
be determined and/or recorded by an external agent. Such an agent need not be human, but
could be any system that is able to correlate itself with the Spekkens system and perform
operations depending on the outcome. In the case of the experimental setup described
above, a (memoryless) external agent needs to acquire at least two bits of information in
order to determine which state the system is in at a given time t: one bit that determines
whether the particle was measured in the x or z basis and one bit that determines the
outcome of the measurement, namely whether the particle is left/right or top/bottom
respectively. We imagine now a situation in which the agent is memoryless, i.e. has no
access to the choice of measurement basis and the measurement result at time t− 1. If we
allow the agent to have only two binary memory cells, one that reads out the choice of
basis given by Xt, and one that reads out the position of the particle, Yt, then once the
agent has determined the state of the system at time t, she needs to reset both memory
cells in order to prepare herself for the next measurement cycle at time t+ 1. Given that
resetting memory cells is costly, there will be a heat cost of kT ln 2 associated with each
measurement cycle.
This is where Cabello et al.’s result enters the picture. The described heat cost can in fact
be reduced to 3/2 bits once we allow the agent to use a recording device, or a memory,
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which allows her to access the measurement results at the previous time-step13 t− 1. In this
case, the agent does not need to perform the position measurement iff xt = xt−1, i.e. if she
finds that the measurement basis at time t is the same as at time t− 1. This is due to the
fact that consecutive measurements in the same basis always yield the same measurement
results. Given that she has access to the previous measurement result, she can therefore
skip the location measurement in 50% of the cases and hence save resources. If the agent
has access to a memory that specifies the previous measurement basis and measurement
outcome, the average amount of bits needed to specify the measurement and outcome at
time t can thereby be reduced to 3/2 bits. The minimal average heat cost per measurement
cycle therefore becomes 32kT ln 2, the value Cabello et al. derived.
Figure 2 illustrates the various steps in an exemplary measurement cycle: after an input
xt, the state of the system has changed into a maximally mixed state. The first step of
the agent must be to determine the measurement basis, i.e. the position of the partition.
This step must be performed during each cycle, and so, given a finite memory for the agent
and the need to create new blank memory states, there is always a heat cost of kT ln 2
associated with this step. If xt = xt−1, nothing further happens, yt−1 changes into yt, but
no resources are required for this step and so the cycle is finished. If xt 6= xt−1 however,
a position measurement must be performed that determines yt. This once more leads to
kT ln 2 units of heat, since the agent only has limited memory and therefore needs to reset
her memory before each measurement. Since this measurement of yt is only performed half
of the time, the average heat cost associated with it is only 12kT ln 2 units of heat. Adding
up the various contributions leads to an average heat cost of 32kT ln 2 per measurement
cycle, in accordance with Cabello et al.’s results. From a global point of view, however, the
Spekkens quantum system itself is in a maximally mixed state from step 2) onwards.
The alleged quantum heat cost therefore merely results from the need to reset the vari-
ous memory cells of the agent that are needed to determine the measurement outcome,
making its existence no more mysterious than the heat cost involved in the consecutive
measurement of the outcomes of a fair coin flip, given limited resources: at each time step
the measurement apparatus must be reset so as to be able to perform the consecutive
measurements. Differently put, in terms of particles and boxes: performing consecutive
RAND operations on a system leads to a heat cost iff the system’s state is recorded at
each time step, in which case the measurement apparatus needs to be reset before each
measurement. What Cabello et al. have shown therefore, is simply that if we allow the
agent to have a memory, the average heat cost for repeatedly recording the outcomes can
13In practice, we need to grant the agent at least two more memory cells as resources, such as to be used
as a memory for the measurement basis and measurement result at time t− 1. In computational mechanics
it is more common simply to supply the agent with an empty tape on which she records the measurement
outcomes and at the same time allow her to access the tape on which the basis choices are written, thereby
providing her with ←−yt and ←−xt .
17
be reduced from 2 bits to 3/2 bits, and no further.
Furthermore, in order to explain the origin of this heat cost, we did not need to mention any
intrinsic values which supposedly determine the future behaviour of the quantum system.
The resources needed for Cabello et al.’s experiment are resources that are to be provided
by the observer who wants to record the measurement results, and not by the quantum
system itself. We note that the observer and his or her resources could well be purely
classical; and we note moreover that the very same heat cost would be incurred even for a
Type II interpretation.
To emphasize how talk about ‘value generation’ is misplaced, we finally consider one last
example of an input-output process, which equally profits from the presence of an external
memory: a feedback NOR channel, where the current output is determined by the input
and the previous output in the standard NOR fashion. Such a channel has two causal
states, and we take it to be driven by a random input Xt, just like before. Calculating the
entropy difference between two consecutive time steps results, similarly to Cabello et al.’s
result, in I∗erased = H(Yt−1|XtYt) = 1/2 bits. Given that this channel is fully deterministic
and only driven by the random variable Xt, it is evident that any talk about the generation
of values that determine the system’s future behaviour is misplaced.
3.3 Some Remarks on Computational Mechanics
The above examples demonstrate that the heat cost attributed to certain types of quantum
interpretation by Cabello et al. leads back to an external agent repeatedly performing
measurements with limited information storage available. The external agent does not
need to be human but could equally be a machine and the calculated heat cost indeed
gives a lower bound to the energy required to run such process. Cabello et al.’s result
therefore clearly plays an important role for determining the resources needed to perform
certain quantum computational tasks. What their argument does not establish however, is
a distinctive and perhaps problematic heat cost for Type I interpretations. We can trace
back the misinterpretation of their mathematical results to a lack of discrimination between
the agent who acts and the system that is acted upon. Instead, agent and system together
were treated as a unified computational machine, leading to the erroneous conclusion that
the individual system itself was driving the computation and was the locus of the heat cost.
This suggests that we need to be more careful when we apply computational mechanics to
the foundations of quantum mechanics. In particular the tempting but somewhat misleading
idea that information is a concrete rather than abstract entity, which gives it the status of
a physical substance that can be transferred and destroyed, leads to intuitions that must
be double checked by contrasting them with real, physical situations (cf. (Timpson, 2013)
for more details on the concrete vs. abstract distinction).
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4 Conclusion
We have analysed the claim that there is a physical difference between two classes of
quantum interpretations in terms of an excess heat generation in successive measurements,
a difference which could in principle be tested experimentally. This is not so: there is
no such differential heat production. In so far as there is a heat cost associated with
successive randomly selected measurements on a quantum system, it arises from accounting
for the external resources needed to record the performance and results of the measurement
operations on the system, and not from a putative erasure process that takes place within the
quantum system itself. That there is no heat cost involved with consecutive measurements
of this kind arising from the quantum system itself—regardless of how one interprets
probabilities—can immediately be seen upon calculating the difference of the von Neumann
entropy of the quantum system between the various time steps, which difference is zero.
This fact is reconciled with Cabello et al.’s quite correct mathematical result precisely by
noting that the latter only concerns—when properly understood—costs of the external
record, of the external agent.
The question of which interpretations might truly represent our world thereby remains
unanswered by thermodynamical considerations concerning successive measurement scenar-
ios.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Adan Cabello, Mile Gu, Andrew Garner and Vlatko Vedral for
helpful discussions as well as David Wallace and Harvey Brown for useful comments. This
work was partially supported by a grant from the Templeton World Charity Foundation
and the British Society for the Philosophy of Science.
19
Appendix
The quantity Ierased has its origin in the difference of the Shannon entropies at times t and
t− 1 as can be seen in the following, short derivation.
H (XtYtSt)−H (XtYt−1St−1) = H (XtYtSt−1)−H (XtYt−1St−1)−H (St−1|XtYtSt)
= H (Xt) +H (Yt|St) +H (St)
−H (Xt)−H (Yt−1|St−1)−H(St−1)−H (St−1|XtYtSt)
= −H (St−1|XtYtSt) = −Ierased,
where we assumed that the process is unifilar, namely H (St|XtYtSt−1) = 0, that the input is
time-independent, i.e. H (Xt−1) = H (Xt) and that the current causal state determines the
output uniquely H (Yt|St) = 0. Following Landauer’s Principle, the physical implementation
of a logical operation leads to a generation of heat equal to at least −kT ln 2 times the total
change in Shannon entropy. To calculate the total change, all involved random variables at
a given time need to be taken into account. Ierased therefore provides a lower bound for
the heat cost involved in the implementation of Cabello et al.’s experiment.
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